Disputes over gay and lesbian rights occupy a central place on both national and international agendas in recent years. This is also the case in societies emerging from chronic ethnonational conflict where debates over gay and lesbian rights versus ethnic-based rights predominate. While much scholarly work focuses on the influence of socio-demographic factors in determining attitudes toward gay and lesbian rights in post-conflict societies, to date, the role of political influences, such as ethnonationalism, is noticeably under-researched. It is with this omission in mind that this paper focuses on the influence of ethnonationalism, or congruency in religious, national and communal identity, on attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights issues.
Introduction
Debates over Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) 1 issues have received increased attention in recent years. This is particularly the case when societies emerging from violent ethnonational conflict are considered. In fact, some scholars go so far as to suggest that because the political settlements reached in such societies prioritize and accommodate the ethnonational dimension of the conflict, violent disputes over sexual citizenship, or the rights of sexual minorities, have now increasingly replaced ethnic divisions as a key source of disagreement within nations emerging from conflict. As a number of commentators note, it is the link between heterosexuality as the dominant group norm and it's taken for granted attribute of the nation that lies at the heart of these divisions (Enloe 2000 , Nagel 2003 , Mole 2011 ).
Under such circumstances, not only are sexual minorities seen as an alien and polluting influence by the previously sparring ethnic groups to the conflict but their presence is often viewed as threat to the very existence of the nation itself. Thus, not only does ethnonationalism in general reproduce 'heterosexual privilege', but 'heterosexism demonizes and even criminalizes non-reproductive sex' (Peterson, 1999: 55, 47) .
Despite the suggested link between ethnonationalism and homophobic views, to date, the impact of ethnonational identity on attitudes towards LGBT rights has not been investigated empirically. The absence of such research must be considered surprising for the following two reasons. First, irrespective of the nature of the division, anti-LGBT and homophobic violence has become a common feature of societies emerging from violent and protracted conflict. Examples, which range from the use of corrective rape against lesbians in apartheid and post-apartheid South
Africa to the targeting of gay and lesbian people by resurgent nationalist governments in both Eastern and Central Europe, all attest to the endemic use of violence against sexual minorities within transitional societies (Mole 2011 , Kulpa 2013 , Thomas et al. 2013 ). Second, in many cases the very bases of the political settlements facilitate the marginalization and/or targeting of sexual minority groups. This is particularly the case when ethnonationalist conflicts are considered, where the formal recognition of sexual minority rights are often side-lined and down-graded in the interests of the perceived need to accommodate and appease salient ethnonationalist identities (Ashe 2009 (Conrad 2004 , Ashe 2009 , Nagle and Clancy 2010 , Duggan 2012 . In fact, more so than any other factor, it is the acceptance of the assumed link between the heterosexual family and the maintenance of ethnonational identity, a view further reinforced via the intersection of ethnic and religious identity, which many commentators point to as the greatest impediment to the public recognition of and support for sexual minority rights in this society.
Ethnonationalism, Sexuality and Homophobia
Ethnonationalism is often conceived very broadly and interchangeably with nationalism (Conversi 2002 , Coakley 2013 . A more parsimonious definition of ethnonationalism focuses on its desire for the territorial boundaries of the state to coincide with the ethnic nation (Hechter 2000) . In ethnonationalism, state and nation building fostered a particularistic ethnic identity that reflects the dominant group's power. Within this institutional environment, 'political office holders have incentives to gain legitimacy by favoring co-ethnics or co-nationals over others when distributing public goods and government jobs' (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2013: 321) . Since legal and political inclusion within the state is dependent on nationality, ethnonational minorities become structurally problematic and subject to either harsh assimilatory policies or denied their full right to equality (Wimmer 2002 ).
These societies, characterized by ethnonational conflict, are thus known as 'deeply divided societies' (Horowitz, 1985) , places where it is said that 'ethnic identity is strongly felt, behaviour based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned, and ethnicity is often accompanied by hostility toward outgroups' (Horowitz 1985: 6) . A key characteristic of ethnonationalism, therefore, involves a strong emphasis on ethnic exclusivism: privileging and favouring co-ethnics versus outsiders, who are framed as dangers to the group and national purity. Under such circumstances, practically all political and cultural issues are reduced to the position of the ethnic cleavage, identities are cross-indexed by ethnic groupness (Horowitz 1985) , and intercommunal boundaries are sharp enough so that 'membership is clear and, with few exceptions, unchangeable' (Lustick 1979: 325) . The tendency of ethnonationalist movements to exalt the 'in-group' in opposition to the loathed 'outgroup' is exacerbated in violently divided societies, since the groups not only live alongside each other but also compete in a zero-sum framework for dominance over the polity.
However, as a number of commentators have noted, national self-glorification and Other-defamation also have a moral and sexual dimension (Mosse 1985 , Nagel, 2003 . National boundaries intersect with sexual ones and these intersections shape prescriptions about what is considered appropriate sexual couplings -specifically, what 'good' women should and should not do, and with whom. Moreover, this seems to be particularly the case in nations that seek to define themselves in ethnic terms, where a sense of belonging is based not only around a belief in a common ancestry, or the principle of a fictive kinship, but also in which the body politic of the nation stands for the family unit (Mole 2011) . In fact, feminist scholars have long pointed to the intimate link between heteronormativity and these ethnosexual intersections, particularly in terms of controlling the sexual practices and behaviour of women (Enloe 2000) .
As both the reproducers and symbolic representatives of the nation, for ethnonationalists, the control of women's sexuality is paramount and revolves around competing matters of female purity as well as male sexual availability and propriety.
As Mosse (1985: 98, 101) put it: 'female embodiments of the nation stood for eternal forces … and suggested innocence and chastity' but the right women had to also be available to the right man: 'the maiden with the shield, the spirit that awaits a masculine leader.' However, women's sexuality is also of concern to ethnonationalists in that, as both wives and daughters, they are also the bearers of masculine honour. Moreover, while female fecundity is both valued and encouraged by ethnonationalist movements as a mechanism to ensure the continued existence of the nation, unruly female sexuality, such as lesbianism or sexual relations with the 'enemy', is not only perceived as a threat to the reproductive survival of the nation but is also viewed as dishonouring the nation's men (Mosse 1985 , Nagel 1998 , 2003 .
Concerns about the sexual purity and activities of women, however, are not the only way that sexuality arises as an issue in nationalist discourse. Male heterosexual activity and homosocial male bonding around militaristic masculine virtues, such as honour, patriotism and bravery, are also considered essential for the establishment and survival of the nation (Mosse 1985 , Enloe 2000 , Nagel 2003 . This is particularly the case in divided societies based on ethnonationalist conflict, where a hyper-militarisation of male values, derivative of the many fraternal and militaristic organisations that emerge during the conflict, becomes the norm. These hyper-(hetero)masculine identities, however, not only form the basis for acceptable male conduct but also seek to denigrate any attempt to call into question their legitimacy, denouncing them as either non-patriotic (feminism) or a threat to the very survival and reproduction of the nation (sexual dissidents). As Nagel (2003: 160) notes: 'Standards for national conduct that reflect masculinized heteronormativity tend also to be homophobic, and thus are intolerant of sexual diversity, particularly homosexuality'.
Yet, as Jasbir Puar (2007 Puar ( , 2013 points out, the assumption that 'the nation is heteronormative and that the queer is inherently an outlaw to the nation-state' is not straightforward. Using the conceptual frame of 'homonationalism' she illustrates 'the complexities of how "acceptance" and "tolerance" for gay and lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated' (Puar 2013: 336) . According to Puar, homonationalism, represents the methods through which some nation-states co-opt lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses as narratives of progress and modernity. In so doing, homonationalism allows states 'to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations' (Puar 2013: 337 only in their increasing adoption of human rights discourses but also the support of nationalist politicians for the sexual minority rights of the LGBT community.
Ethnonationalism, Sexual Minority Rights and the Agreement
Signed in April 1998, the Northern Ireland Agreement was a result of negotiations aimed at ending three decades of conflict which resulted in the deaths of more than 3,500 people, the vast majority of which were members of the civilian population (Hayes and McAllister 2013) . Based on a consociational model of conflict regulation and the 'principle of parity in esteem', a key assumption of the Agreement was that entrenched communal divisions could be accommodated and eventually ameliorated through institutionalized power-sharing arrangements. These institutionalized powersharing arrangements included: the formation of a Northern Ireland Assembly with devolved legislative powers; the creation of a 'power-sharing' Northern Ireland
Executive, headed by a premiership diarchy (a first minister and deputy first minister possessing equal powers) and using the D'Hondt method to allocate ministers proportionately to the main parties; 6 and the introduction of the cross-community support principle for any major decisions taken by the Assembly. 7 In fact, more so than any other factor, critics of consociationalism argue that it was this legislative requirement of cross-community support for major decisions and its accompanying system of mutual vetoes which has not legitimized ethnonational division but has also led to the carve up of electoral politics along communal lines (Taylor 2009: 320) . As Racioppi and See (2006: 203) Although the Agreement was primarily designed as a mechanism to manage, and eventually alleviate ethnonational conflict, provisions were also made to supposedly safeguard those members of society that subscribed to identities outside of the ethnonational framework. In particular, a section in the Agreement on Human
Rights stated that public authorities in Northern Ireland would 'promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation (Northern Ireland Office 1998: 20) .
Overseen and monitored by a newly established and independent public body -the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland -this statutory obligation on public authorities was subsequently implemented under Section 75 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act. Under this legislation, not only were public authorities legally obliged to promote 'good practice and due regard' for all minority groups in Northern Ireland, including sexual minority groups, but also to involve them in consultation processes.
As a result of this legislative activity, sexual minority communities in Northern
Ireland are now officially designated as stakeholders in social and political initiatives and a number of laws have been introduced to protect their rights. concern -such that a motion can only pass if a majority of nationalists and unionists support it -not only did the DUP exercise the 'communal' veto to block legislation designed to further equality for a non-ethnonational grouping, in this case sexual minorities, but, in doing so, they ironically used a mechanism designed to stop majoritarian ethnonational policies. 10 Even more recently and in response to a row over a pro-gay marriage cake, the DUP, via a private members bill tabled in December 2014, is seeking to introduce a conscious clause into equality legislation - 
Ethnonationalism and Gay and Lesbian Rights
As noted earlier, the conflict in Northern Ireland was viewed as a long-standing dispute over two contested ethnonational identities, British-unionism versus Irishnationalism. And, while religious identity served as an important boundary-marker in identifying the protagonists, the conflict could not be reduced to religious terms. This is not to suggest, however, that the conflict was totally bipolar in nature. As previous research has shown, both within and between these two opposing ethnonationalist traditions, there are also important intra-religious differences in terms of national and communal identity (see Fahey et al 2006 , Coakley 2007 , Hayes and McAllister 2013 Recent research lends support to these earlier findings. As the data in Table 1 demonstrates clearly, although national identity and communal affiliation significantly overlap in both religious communities, they are by no means coterminous. [Insert Table 2 These findings are repeated when attitudes towards the teaching of gay and lesbian rights in schools are considered. Again, it is those who are willing to endorse an ethnonationalist label that emerge as the most negative in viewpoint. For example, whereas two-thirds of Protestants who endorsed such a label -a British-unionist identity -rejected the teaching of equality rights for gays and lesbians in schools, the equivalent proportion among those who did express this dual identity was markedly lower at 49 per cent. Divisions, albeit less marked, also occur when the Catholic community is considered, with those who expressed a congruency in identity being the most negative in their views. Again, this is not to discount the notable religious differences in opinion regarding this issue, with Protestants being significantly more likely to adopt a negative stance than Catholics.
Multivariate analysis lends some further, albeit partial, support to these findings. Even when a range of background factors are included in the analysis, ethnonationalism, or congruency in national and communal identity, emerges as a significant predictor of attitudes, albeit solely among Protestants (see Tables 3 and 4) .
Irrespective of whether attitudes towards the validity of same-sex marriage or the teaching of gay and lesbian rights in schools is considered, it is individuals within the Protestant community, who perceive themselves as both British and unionist, who emerge as the most negative in their views. This is not the case, however, among the Catholic community where socio-demographic background, and not ethnonational identity, emerges as a significant predictor of attitudes.
Focusing initially on attitudes towards same-sex marriages, the results in Table   3 are clear. Even when a range of socio-political factors are included in the analysis, ethnonationalism emerges as a significant predictor of views among Protestants.
Protestants that see themselves as both British and unionist are significantly more likely to view such marriages as invalid than those who do not. This is not to suggest, however, that ethnonationalism is the sole predictor of attitudes among Protestants in this instance. Other noteworthy determinants include the positive effects of gender, church attendance, and age. Males, regular church attenders, and older individuals are significantly more likely to hold a more negative view of such marriages than either females, irregular church attenders, or the young. For Catholics, by contrast, it is socio-demographic factors, and not ethnonationalism, that emerged as the key predictor of views. Males, older individuals, as well as the lesser educated are significantly more likely to consider such marriages as invalid in comparison to females, the young, or the well-educated.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
These results are repeated when attitudes towards the teaching of equality for gay and lesbians in schools are considered (see Table 4 ). While both ethnonationalism and socio-demographic background stand out as a significant predictor of attitudes among Protestants, this is not the case among Catholics where it is again sociodemographic background that emerges as the sole predictor of opinion in this instance. As in our earlier analysis, not only are Protestants who see themselves as both British and unionist significantly more likely to reject the teaching of equality rights for gays and lesbians in schools, but this is also the case among regular church attenders and those with no educational qualification. Among Catholics, it is again socio-demographic factors, such as gender, age and educational attainment, which emerge as the key predictor of views.
[Insert Table 4 about 
Explaining the Influence of Ethnonationalism on Protestant Views
As noted earlier, homophobic attitudes have a long and deep-seated tradition in
Northern Ireland, and this appears to be particularly the case when views among the Protestant community are considered. Previous research has shown consistently that not only do Protestants hold more negative views about homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights than Catholics, but this is also the case when views of their political leaders, particularly within the DUP, or the most 'hardline' ethnonationalist party within the unionist community, are considered (Duggan 2012 The results in Table 5 support this explanation. Irrespective of whether contact with gay and lesbian people, perceptions of the origins of homosexuality, or general attitudes towards equality rights for gay and lesbian people are considered, Protestants that perceive themselves as both British and unionist are significantly more likely to adopt a negative stance in relation to these issues than those who do not. For example, whereas just over two-fifths of Protestants with an overlapping national and communal identity claimed to have had no contact with members of the gay or lesbian community, the equivalent proportion among those who rejected this dual identity was markedly lower at just 27 per cent. Similar differences emerge when the source of homosexual orientation or attitudes towards the equality rights of gay and lesbian people are considered. It is again Protestants who are congruent in both their national and communal identity that emerge as the most negative or homophobic in their views.
[Insert Table 5 about here] To what extent does their more negative stance in relation to these same-sex issues explain our previously demonstrated link between congruency in ethnonationalism and negative attitudes towards same-sex marriage and the teaching of gay and lesbian rights in schools? Tables 6 and 7 address this Overall the results lend much support to our hypothesis that it is antipathy towards homosexuality and the equality rights of gay and lesbian people that is the primary factor in explaining attitudes towards same-sex marriage and the teaching of equality rights for gay and lesbian people in schools. As the data in Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate clearly, although ethnonational identity has a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards both these issues (see model 1), an effect that remains even when a range of control variables are included in the regression equation (see model 2), this statistically significant difference disappears once our proposed explanation is included in the analysis (see model 3). In other words, it is antipathy towards homosexuality and the equality rights of gay and lesbian people that is the primary factor in accounting for the impact of ethnonationalism on attitudes towards same-sex marriage and the teaching of equality rights in schools.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] Of these various determinants, however, it is that attitudes towards equality rights for gay and lesbian people which emerges as the key predictor in accounting for views. In both cases, the results are statistically significant and in the direction expected: Protestants who adopt a negative stance in relation to this issue are also significantly more likely to view same sex marriage as invalid and also to reject the teaching of equality rights for gay and lesbian people in schools. Thus, and in partial support of the homonationalism thesis, a key finding of this analysis is the possible conflation of gay and ethnic minority rights among Protestants, or in this instance, the perception of a positive link between the rights of gay and lesbian people and that of the minority nationalist community. This is not to suggest, however, that attitudes towards equality legislation for gays and lesbians are the sole determinant of views in this instance. Other notably, albeit less consistent, determinants includes the significant positive effect of perceptions concerning the voluntary origins of homosexuality on attitudes towards same-sex marriages. As in previous international research (Haider-Markel 2008) , individuals who perceive homosexuality as a matter of choice -as compared to those who believe it is biologically determined -are also notably more likely to adopt a negative stance in relation to this issue than those who do not. Finally, at least as far as opinions on same-sex marriage are concerned, there is also some evidence to suggest that, even when attitudes towards a range of samesex issues are included in the analysis, socio-demographic background remains an additional and significant determinant of Protestant views. Replicating our earlier analysis, it is again men, regular church attenders and older individuals who stand out as the most negative in their views
Conclusion
In recent years, explorations of the relationship between gender, nationalism and warfare have gained increasing momentum, particularly within feminist scholarship.
There is now a considerable body of work to suggest that not only is nationalism and ethnonationalism profusely patriarchal but it is also deeply embedded within a heteronormative framework. Even as a number of nation-states adopt the rhetoric of 'homonationalism', such narratives merely act as inclusionary and exclusionary devices to signify which sections of the population should be accorded membership of the nation. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that this is particularly the case in societies emerging from violent and deeply-seated conflict based on ethnonational lines. As noted earlier, in such societies not only do national boundaries intersect with sexual ones but these intersections both dictate and determine what is considered appropriate sexual couplings. More so than any other issue, it is this factor -the intimate link between ethnonationalism and heteronormativity -which many commentators point to as not only the root cause of an increase in the frequency and intensity of violence against sexual minorities in such societies but also in the escalation in levels of public antipathy towards the rights of LGBT people more generally.
The results of this study, however, lend only partial support to this hypothesis, or the assumed link between ethnonational identity and a homophobic stance in relation to gay and lesbian rights in societies emerging from deeply-seated ethnonational conflict. Irrespective of whether attitudes towards the validity of samesex marriage or the teaching of gay and lesbian rights in schools are considered, although ethnonational identity is a key predictor of attitudes among Protestants, it is socio-demographic background, and not ethnonationalism, which emerges as the key determinant of Catholic views. Thus, at least as far as negative attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights in Northern Ireland are concerned, the influence of ethnonationalism is an exclusively Protestant phenomenon.
What may explain these religious differences in findings? Part of an explanation we suggest rests with the long-standing and greater attachment to ethnonationalist identity within the Protestant community as compared to their This is not to discount, however, the mediating impact of attitudes towards a range of same-sex issues on the relationship between ethnonational identity and attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights within the Protestant community. As the results also show, once opinions on a range of same-sex issues are included in the analysis, the influence of ethnonationalist identity is reduced to insignificance. Of these various issues, however, it is that attitudes towards equality rights for gay and lesbian people which emerges as the key predictor in accounting for views.
Protestants who adopt a negative stance in relation to this issue are also significantly more likely to view same sex marriage as invalid and also to reject the teaching of equality rights for gay and lesbian people in schools. As previously suggested, one possible explanation for this finding is the homonationalism thesis, or the possible conflation of gay and lesbian rights issues with ethnic minority rights issues for the nationalist community. As discussed earlier, for many unionists not only was the inclusion of minority rights legislation in the Agreement viewed as a nationalist plot to further their interests at their expense but it was also perceived as deeply damaging to the rights of the Protestant community in terms of a blatant attack on their British identity and cultural heritage.
It is to an investigation of this issue -the possible conflation of ethnic minority rights issues with other minority rights -among both majority and minority ethnic groupings that future research should be directed. Such research should focus on the rights of a range of minority groups, such as women's rights as well as the rights of other minority identity groups outside the dominant ethnic cleavage.
Moreover, where possible, the research should be cross-national and comprehensive in focus, investigating the impact of ethnonationalism on these issues across a range of transitional societies emerging from violent and deep-seated ethnonationalist conflict.
Endnotes

1
Given its dominance in the research literature and associated legislative and policy initiatives, we use the term LGTB rather than LGBTQ or LGBTQI, although it should be noted that debates about bisexual and transgender concerns have received much less attention than those related to lesbian and gay rights.
2
Alternative analysis which also included congruency in territorial preferences gave rise to identical substantive findings.
3
Because of the absence of survey data on views concerning the rights of bisexual and transgendered people, only attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women are investigated in the analysis. To permit the latter, the Agreement requires that members elected to the Assembly designate themselves as 'nationalist, unionists, and others', and no member can change their designation more than once during an Assembly session. 
10
This was the third time that the DUP used a 'petition of concern' to veto the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland. Both in October 2012
and April 2013, the DUP also used this mechanism to narrowly defeat a Sinn
Féin-backed motion to allow same-sex couples to marry. Currently, Northern
Ireland is the only region within the United Kingdom that has not introduced legislation to permit same-sex marriage.
11
The DUP's proposed 'Freedom of Conscience Amendment Bill' was a reaction to Northern Ireland's Equality Commission supporting a gay rights activist in a court case against a Christian-owned bakery that refused on religious grounds to make a cake with a pro-gay marriage slogan. Sinn Féin has stated that they will block the bill should it be voted on in the assembly.
12
See Mitchell and Tully (2004) . 
Notes: Attitudes about teaching gay rights in schools are coded 0 (yes) and 1 (no); *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a , missing category of comparison; Alternative analysis based on a logistic regression model gave rise to identical substantive conclusions.
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2012. 
The question was: 'Which of these two statements comes closest to your own view? Lesbians and gay men are born that way and their sexual orientation is not something that can be changed or Lesbians and gay men choose their sexual orientation they can change it if they want to'; Do you personally know anyone who is gay or lesbian?; Some people think that people who are gay or lesbian are still not treated equally in our society, while others think that efforts to make things equal has gone too far. What is your opinion?' Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2012. 
Notes: Attitudes towards same-sex marriages are coded 0 (valid) and 1 (invalid); *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a , missing category of comparison; Alternative analysis based on a logistic regression model gave rise to identical substantive conclusions.
Notes: Attitudes towards teaching about equality for gay and lesbian people are coded from 0 (more definitely needs to be done) to 1 (definitely gone too far); *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a , missing category of comparison; Alternative analysis based on a logistic regression model gave rise to identical substantive conclusions.
